

## “IS SARTRE’S PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM CREDIBLE?”

“Man is what he makes of himself”

(1948:28. Sartre)

Aristotle held the view that the understanding of anything depends on or is profoundly facilitated by obtaining the correct definition of it at the start of one’s investigation. It is therefore a good idea to look at what is meant by freedom within philosophy.

The philosophy of freedom is often contrasted with the philosophy of determinism.

The great problem of freedom and determinism is really two problems. The first problem is whether it is possible to establish that human choices and actions are free or causally determined. This is a metaphysical question.[1] The second problem is that of the implications that either freedom or determinism have for our moral, personal and social lives. This is an ethical question.

Determinism is usually the thesis that all our mental states and acts, including choices and decisions, and all our actions are effects necessitated by preceding causes. Thus our futures are fixed and unalterable in much the same way that the past is. (1995:292 Honderich) There is a lot at stake if determinism is true. If determinism is true, we have no place for moral responsibility, resentment, gratitude, life-hopes, and personal feelings. No one could ever rationally deliberate about any type of action because deliberation makes sense only if genuine alternatives are available to us. Thus the implications of determinism for moral responsibility are enormous.[2] Determinism and holding people responsible are incompatible. Typically we believe that agents are morally responsible only for those acts that are freely chosen and within the power of the agent to decide. Recently, quantum mechanics and relativity theory have generally displaced Newtonian mechanics and many scientist and not a few philosophers believe that the dragon of determinism has been slain. However the problem about moral responsibility has not quite disappeared. The indeterminism involved in quantum mechanics, however, is pure randomness, real chance. The question about moral responsibility remains. A pure chance event in you would not be anything that got you moral credit. (1995:195 Honderich) This situation is perfectly expressed in Hume’s Fork.

‘Either our actions are determined, in which case we are not responsible for them, or they are the result of random events, in which case we are not responsible for them’. (2002:177. Pinker.)

Sartre is considered by many to be the greatest modern philosopher of freedom. He rejects every notion of determinism in any shape or form.

Sartre’s phenomenology of freedom, as Richard Kearney refers to it, makes the metaphysical claim that freedom is the final truth about reality.

“There is no difference between free being ... and absolute being.”

(1948:47. J.P. Sartre)

Sartre’s claim to absolute freedom is founded in his doctrine of existentialism, which asserts that

‘existence precedes essence’. He elaborates on this fundamental claim of existentialism as follows:

“ What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism”

(1948:28.J.P.Sartre)

In Sartre’s view the claim that ‘existence precedes essence’ has the implication that the notion of a God who creates and who knows precisely what he is creating, becomes obsolete. Sartre does away with the notion that each individual man is the realisation of a certain conception, which dwells in the divine understanding. (1948:27.J.P.Sartre)

“ If God does not exist, there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man, or as Heidegger has it, the human reality.”

(1948:28.J.P.Sartre)

The non-existence of God has implications for our ethical values. If God does not exist, then with him disappears all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. If God does not exist, everything is permitted and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. (1948:34.J.P.Sartre)

In fact, Sartre not only does away with the concept of God, he also rejects the notion of the existence of such a thing as human nature. The notion of a human nature would imply that ‘each man is a particular example of a universal conception, the conception of Man.’ For Sartre that is an unacceptable definition of man because it negates the historic existence which we confront in experience.

To understand these claims one has to look at Sartre’s work within the framework of phenomenology. It is within the framework of phenomenology that Sartre’s notion of freedom makes sense and may be credible. I will therefore in detail explain how the phenomenological notions of intentionality, authenticity etc bear onto Sartre’s phenomenology of freedom. Phenomenology, first expounded by Husserl, has proved one of the most influential philosophies of our time. Phenomenology heralded a revolutionary turn in the conception and methodology of philosophy within the 20th century. The most influential characteristic of phenomenology is that the traditional notion of the category of ‘substance’ is replaced by the category of ‘relation’. Relation,

insists Husserl, is not something which occurs between two distinct substances- e.g. man and world – as if they formerly existed independently of each other, but man and world are first and foremost in relation; it is only subsequently, at the reflective level of logic, that we divide them into separate entities.

Phenomenology, as laid out by Husserl, is first and foremost a method[3] of enquiry, which aims to describe and clarify the knowledge-performance of the knower. Husserl's phenomenology is therefore in the first place a theory of knowledge[4]. It aims to return to the origins of knowledge by examining how the world appears to human consciousness[5]. Phenomenology aims to demonstrate how the world is an experience which we live before it becomes an object which we know in some impersonal or detached fashion. Husserl distinguishes between 'for' consciousness and consciousness 'of' something. The meaning of the world is constituted only in and through consciousness and consciousness is at the same time consciousness of something other than itself. The human mind is an 'intentional' activity, which always moves beyond itself towards reality. One has 'to be' conscious in the first place in order to be able to be conscious of something. Meaning is neither in the mind alone, nor in the world alone.[6] Meaning is an 'intentional'[7] relationship between the two. We exist in the world before we are reflectively aware of either our own separate existence or the world's separate existence. The important difference between Husserl's phenomenology and philosophy before Husserl is that consciousness can no longer be considered as a box, which contains perceptions or images of objects within itself. The object is not, as Hume and the empiricists maintained, a representation or faded impression inside my head. But consciousness is 'intentional'. This means that TO PERCEIVE OR IMAGINE AN OBJECT MY CONSCIOUSNESS IS ALREADY OUT THERE REACHING TOWARD THE OBJECT ITSELF. The meaning of the objective world is its mode of engaging human consciousness. The meaning of our subjective consciousness is the mode in which it opens towards the world. The two poles objectivity and subjectivity are in fact inseparable, each being co-determined by the other in a primordial relation. (1994:13-23.R. Kearney). Man can no longer be considered as some timeless essence or substance but only as an intentional activity[8], which is constantly surpassing itself and reconstituting itself throughout its existence. This implies the notion of freedom. According to Husserl, the physical 'facts' of nature are governed by causal laws of empirical observation, the 'phenomena' of consciousness operate according to non-causal laws of intentional relation which pre-exist the objectified world of nature. (1994:17.R. Kearney). It is from this position that Sartre's claim of man's total freedom becomes possible and therefore gains credibility. The notion of man reconstituting himself throughout his existence that is taken up by Heidegger, who gave phenomenology an 'existentialist' orientation. Heidegger's initial project consisted in the concrete description of man's moods and projects as a being- in- the-world. He shifts the emphasis from the workings of consciousness to 'the meaning of being'. He accepts Husserl's necessity of moving beyond subject-object dualism in order to go back to our 'originary' experience of the world, that is, to 'the things themselves'. Heidegger shifts Husserl's emphasis from 'consciousness-of-the-world' to 'being- in- the-world'. The question shifts from 'what does it mean to know' to 'what does it mean to be'. 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' Heidegger inquires into the ultimate why of being. He starts with a concrete description of man's being-there (Da-sein), a phenomenological analysis of human being. According to Heidegger man's essence lies in his existence. There is no essential self or given cogito before there are intentional acts, which constitute the 'self' as a meaning- project. Man is, as Heidegger puts it, 'the only being whose existence is an issue for him'. Man is the only being who can ex-sist, who can stand back from (ex-sistere) the objective condition of things but it is precisely as an existential being that man can never truly understand himself as a fixed object among others, as a self-identical identity. On the contrary, man is a being who is perpetually reaching beyond himself towards the world, by recollecting the past and projecting the future. Heidegger describes Dasein, as a mode of being which is always projecting itself beyond itself

towards its possibilities. Human being must be understood as a project of possibility. 'Because we exist in time, we are what we are not – in the sense of being what we are 'no longer' (our past) or 'not yet' (our future)'. We are therefore limited but not determined by environmental cultural, social, psychological or economic conditions (facticity) because Dasein understands even its own facticity in terms of possibility. It is this ability to understand itself in terms of possibilities that gives Dasein his freedom. Dasein is free to redetermine the predetermined, to reinterpret actuality in the light of possibility. This freedom depends on the resoluteness of the decision. Since the human being is a temporal being who reinterprets his past or present in the light of his future, into a horizon of possibilities, man's understanding of the world always involves a decision of self – understanding. This is where Heidegger becomes interesting. Understanding for Heidegger is not analytic or reflective consciousness, but rather refers to the prereflective 'moods' of our lived experience such as anguish, guilt, fear, concern, wonder etc. These 'moods' are not psychological emotions but ontological acts of pre-understanding. Heidegger argues that anguish is not reducible to its causes, but is ontologically inextricable from being-in-the-world as an experience of non-being. Anguish, the most fundamental of all our existential moods, lacks any identifiable object. It occurs precisely where 'nothing' is the matter, because we have an every moment awareness of our ultimate nothingness, our being-towards-death. However we usually conceal this knowledge from ourselves. We cannot have a detached or impersonal 'representation' of nothingness; for it is the realisation of the self itself and of all objective entities as ultimately groundless. The self thus discovers that it is nothingness. This realization has extraordinary consequences. Anguish, the experience of our ultimate non-being, opens us to a more fundamental manifestation of Being expressed in an attitude of care – different from what is commonly known in our everyday existence. Anguish may be said to function as a prelude to a caring for Being which gives birth to conscience (Gewissen). However this conscience is not an invention of our private subjectivity but is given to us by Being itself. Answering the call of conscience and acknowledging the hidden ontological message of anguish as the revelation of our nothingness, we become more care-ful of Being. We no longer take our being-in-the-world for granted. This is what Heidegger means when he describes our experience of nothingness as 'the veil of Being'. We become authentic<sup>[9]</sup> when we cease to take the world for granted as some objective entity 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden), recognizing it instead as an open horizon of possibilities 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden) forging our projects of the future. The first step towards this living authentically, is to assume responsibility for my being-towards-death, my ultimate nothingness. To live inauthentically is to refuse a revelation of Being which is my experience of nothingness. I live inauthentically to the extent that I flee from my awareness of freedom, seeking refuge in 'they', who tell me what to think and what to be, in a passive attitude of mindless distraction and conformity. To experience anguish is to return to the authentic awareness that I am a displaced person, forever out of joint with the 'they' and indeed with myself. It is to recognize that nobody can die for me. Heidegger claims that because we exist before we are objectively aware that we exist, this understanding is existential before it is philosophical. Our understanding consists in what he terms 'a hermeneutic circle'. We already know – however vaguely – what we are looking for when we ask the question of Being, otherwise we would be unable to recognize what we find. (1994:29-36.R. Kearney).

The influence of Heidegger on Sartre is enormous.

If Heidegger had adapted phenomenology to the question of being, Sartre readapted it to the question of freedom. (1994:52.R. Kearney). In a radically humanistic turn, Sartre makes Man not Being the centre of the existential stage. This results in a major deviation from Heidegger's concept of Dasein. Meaning for Sartre is not a gift of being, but an invention of the human individual. (1994:52.R. Kearney). This is a crucial difference because it takes Sartre's notion of freedom out of the realm of any possible mystical experience or absolute value structure. For Heidegger the meaning of being is something that is received through the complete acceptance of our mode of existence 'anguish', resulting in conscience and care. In fact for the later Heidegger the most essential form of thinking (Denken) is thanking (Danken), that is, an openness to and guardianship

of the truth of Being. (1994:44 R. Kearney). This suggests in my view that Heidegger re-introduces the notion of an absolute truth of Being, an absolute value structure, thereby in some manner or form reapplying a notion of essence, but this time an essence constituted through relationship. The freedom Heidegger referred to consists in a freedom of either accepting or fleeing from our existential anguish which results in respectively authentic or inauthentic ways of living. It could be argued that Heidegger's notion of conscience, as a gift of meaning by being, is close in practice to Kant's Moral Law[10], which reveals itself through the use of Reason. Both the gift of meaning and the Moral Law can only be received or revealed themselves through the practice of freedom from our mindless distractions and conformities.

Sartre endorses Kant's notion that freedom is a will both to itself and to freedom of others. (1948:52.J.P.Sartre)

For Sartre though freedom is absolute. Man is free, man is freedom. (1948:34.J.P.Sartre)  
"Everyone can do what he likes, and will be incapable, from such a point of view, of condemning either the point of view or the action of anyone else."

(1948:24.J.P.Sartre)

Sartre's notion of freedom is freedom as absolute choice. However when Sartre claims that everyone can do what he likes, he does not take morality out of the equation of choice, nor does he take away the importance of taking responsibility for one's choices.

"Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his shoulders."

(1948:294.J.P.Sartre)

We are what we are, good, bad or indifferent, not because we were born like that, but because we made ourselves like that. To make matters worse, nobody escapes from the disturbing thought of what would happen if everyone did as we do. Man makes himself by the choice of his morality and he cannot but choose a morality. This inescapability and the responsibility of choice results in anguish. The anguish arises, not as an existential mode of being in the face of our nothingness as for Heidegger, but because there is no objective criterion of value, which would guarantee or vindicate our actions in any absolute fashion. We also experience anguish because we are aware that our choice of action is not just a choice of each individual self for itself but for all men.

"When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one, which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of what is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all.'

(1948:28.J.P.Sartre)

Richard Kearney considers this an endorsement by Sartre of Kant's dictum that we should act in such a way that our actions are universalisable for all other individuals also. (1994:57.R. Kearney). Sartre indeed explains later in the essay that all our actions are a commitment on behalf of all mankind. When a man chooses he commits himself but he is thereby at the same time 'legislator deciding for the whole of mankind'. This creates anguish because it means that I have to ask myself for every choice I make 'Am I really a man or woman who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do.' Sartre acknowledges that there are many who do not show such anxiety but they are, according to him, merely disguising their anguish or are in flight from it. (1948:30. Sartre) Sartre stresses that absolute freedom of choice does not take away our right to judge other people choices as founded on error.

"One can judge a man by saying that he deceives himself. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver."

(1948:50J.P.Sartre)

However in my view Sartre's claim of absolute choice remains obscure. What does Sartre mean for instance that we are unable ever to choose the worse? Is there a hint of determinism sneaking in here? What does it mean 'what we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all'? Is it not possible, for instance, to live by the rational universalisable principle of pure egoism that is 'that it is rational for everyone to do what is in her or his own interests'. This view was expressed by David Hume ...

"Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. Tis not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and to have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.". (19973:320P.Singer)

Sartre accepts that we choose within limits. He is the first to acknowledge that our existence is always situated in a concrete historical context but we do choose within the limitation of these circumstances. (1994:53.R. Kearney). But no matter what the conditioning limits of our past or present may be, our future offers itself to us as a blank canvas waiting to be filled in. In fact, it is in this sense that Sartre's philosophy of freedom does become very practical if not credible, particularly if we see it in the context of the time for which it was written. In my view, Sartre's argument for absolute human freedom needs to be understood not only in the context of 20th century philosophy but more importantly in the context of 20th century history. 'Existentialism and Humanism', was written and published after the war in 1946. Europe was in a sad state. A disillusioned people were faced with the rebuilding of their world and this according to Sartre could

only be done from the sole resources of each individuals' consciousness. Freedom and the responsibility of an absolute choice, provided for Sartre, the best possibility of a radically new beginning. (1994:53.R. Kearney). Sartre passionately argues in 'Existentialism and Humanism' that each human being can transcend the conditioning circumstances of his past and creates himself, as it were out of nothing. For Sartre the ultimate condition of 20th century man is one of abandonnement, anguish and total freedom.

For Sartre there is a difference between living sincerely and living authentically. Sartre calls the traditional attitude that we are predetermined to be what we are by some innate or a priori principle such as God or Reason, 'sincerity' or 'seriousness'.

He posits sincerity or seriousness in contrast to authenticity. The sincere person believes that existence is a matter of living out a pre-established role in society, of occupying an appointed place in the universe. This way the sincere person manages to avoid the anguish and responsibility of freely choosing how to exist by presuming that this existential choice has been made for him. For the sincere person, existence is a way of remaining faithful to his pre-ordained essence, of being true to his given self. The authentic person, on the other hand, begins by acknowledging that there is no given self to be true to. (1994:53.R. Kearney).

"Man primarily is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so... Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be."

(1948:28.J.P.Sartre)

Sartre is adamant that man is condemned to be free. Even the choice to have no choice is itself a choice. The existentialist demand for free choice results in a demand for free action. Since Sartre denies any form of determinism our actions must be free. Truth, for Sartre is the sum of each individual's freely chosen actions. (1994:29-52.R. Kearney).

The example of his student who has to choose between going to the war or looking after his mother, is interesting. Sartre reminds his student 'You are free, therefore choose.' However, in my view, the student will not know which desire pulled the strongest until he finds himself either with his mother or in the war. I would therefore argue that our actions reveal our motives rather than our freedom. Sartre's view of human freedom leaves no room for the Freudian concept of mind. According to Freud the psyche cannot be reduced to the conscious domain[11]. In fact Freud denies the possibility of a Cartesian Cogito, which Sartre unequivocally subscribes to. In my view, Sartre's denial of the Freudian unconscious leaves his claim to absolute freedom of choice very vulnerable. Freud clearly demonstrated that there is a distinct difference between the emergence of a thought or desire and this thought or desire becoming conscious.

However, there can be no doubt that my actions reveal my choice and my commitment. The nature and the extent of these choices is reflected in my actions every time I make a decision and in particular every time I spend any money. Sartre is right when he claims that there can be no truth except in what I show through my actions. Our actions reveal the ethical principles we actually put in practice and to which our life is a testament. They are what Wittgenstein calls, our absolute judgements of value, (2001:348. Glock) expressed in our attitudes, regardless whether there is or is

not an objective moral standard. They are shown rather than argued for. For instance, the investment in an environmentally friendly water cleaning system in our family home is an expression of an absolute value judgment. It makes no short-term or long-term economic sense and it does not even make a lot of difference in the overall levels of water pollution on the planet. A rational justification is not required, my commitment is shown. A rational justification though, may on occasion, convince others to behave in similar ways.

Sartre in my view, did not succeed in adequately establishing that our human choices and cautions are free rather than causally determined, even though his claims are credible within the framework of phenomenological enquiry of the 20th century. However this does not diminish Sartre's point that we have a choice to make and we need to know what we are choosing between. We need to accept and take responsibility for the consequences of our actions. We are free to choose, either to help or to hinder in any of our life circumstances.

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[1] Metaphysics inquires about how the world must be at base beyond the sensory deception. The metaphysician wants to understand the world once and for all unlike the scientist who attempts to clarify the structure and processes of our world through the patient observation of its sensible phenomena and to build hypotheses in accordance with the observations. However it is important to note that metaphysics is a rational project and therefore distinguished from knowledge of the world obtained through revelation or mystical experience. The metaphysician reaches his conclusions by logical arguments starting from assumptions that would be readily accepted by any reasonable person. (1998:xii. *The Metaphysics* \* Penguin Publishers)

[2] After Newton propounded his laws of gravitation and mechanics, Laplace pointed out that if a powerful intellect (usually called Laplace's demon) possessed an understanding of Newton's laws, and had a description of the current position and momentum of each particle in the universe, and the requisite mathematical ability, that powerful intellect could predict and retrodict every event in the history of the universe. This 'clockwork universe' came to dominate the physical theory of the next two centuries, causing great consternation among theologians and most moral philosophers. (1995:195 Honderich)

[3] The method consists in:

- a. **Epoche:** the bracketing of all our presuppositions particularly that there are such things as beings existing independently of our consciousness. With this attitude, the evidence of fiction (non-empirical or 'possible' experience) is considered just as reliable as that of fact. Both are equally valid experiences of consciousness. The mind is thus freed from its servile attachment to literal 'reality', which we normally take for granted, and comes to know its own intentionality more intimately and more accurately.
- b. **Reduction:** a return to the generating axis of our intentional experiences before they are overlaid by objectifying constructs.
- c. **Free Variation:** pure possibilities are played with until an invariant structure is revealed, common to all the possible appearances of the thing to our consciousness.
- d. **Intuition:** involves an active repossession of the passive play of possibilities, reuniting them in a single grasp. While the content of our empirical experience and our phenomenological experience can be same (there can be a strict parallelism between a factual and a possible table), the attitude towards this content is different. The world ceases to be a self-evident given but becomes instead a gift of meaning.
- e. **Description:** this stage is the descriptive stage which records the preceding phases of the method and makes them available to others as a document (1994:19-20.R. Kearney).

[4] Husserl considers the goal of his method to be a transcendental experience of consciousness capable of producing universally valid knowledge. (1994:19.R. Kearney). However it is important to note that for Husserl, we arrive at an intuition of universal meanings not from within the solitary resources of transcendental subjectivity (Cartesian) but by means of a communal validation wherein each subject reciprocally corrects or confirms the other's phenomenological description of his experience. (1994:23.R. Kearney).

“In our continually streaming perception of the world we are not isolated but rather stand within it in contact with other men. ... In living with one another each can participate in the life of the other. Thus, in general, the world does not exist for isolated individuals but for the community of men: and this is due to the communalisation of the straightforwardly perceptual. ... It is only by making oneself understood that we have the possibility of recognizing that the things which one sees are the same as those which the other sees. (1994: 23.R. Kearney).”

[5] Husserl distinguishes between objects of consciousness –e.g. a table – and acts of consciousness - perception, imagination, signification ect. (1994:21.R. Kearney).

[6] The phenomenological attitude claimed to overcome the traditional extremes of idealism and realism.

It rejected the efforts of philosophical idealism to overcome subject-object dualism by confining meaning to a solitary consciousness cut off from the world (e.g. in the manner of the Cartesian Cogito or Kantian noumenal Ego). (1994:16R. Kearney).

[7] Intentionality is a technical term for a distinguishing feature of states of mind: the fact that they are ‘about’ or represent things. The term derives from the medieval Latin *intentio*, a scholastic term for the ideas or representations of things formed by the mind. the term was revived in 1874 by Franz Brentano for ‘the direction of the mind on an object’. (1995:412 Honderich)

It was Franz Brentano, the 19th century philosopher of scholastic formation who first taught Husserl that the human mind is an intentional activity, which always moves beyond itself towards reality. (1994:15.R. Kearney).

Brentano’s idea was that intentionality is the mark of the mental: all and only mental states are intentional, meaning that one cannot believe, wish, or hope without believing or wishing something. Beliefs, wishes, desires, hopes, and the like are therefore often called ‘intentional states’. (1995:412 Honderich) ‘Intentionality’ does not necessarily involve the idea of intention – in the sense that actions are intentional. Intentions themselves though are intentional states. (most contemporary philosophers deny that all mental phenomena are intentional in any case, on the grounds that sensations like pains are not ‘directed’ on anything. ) (1995.412Honderich)

[8] Brentano’s thesis of intentionality, that every mental phenomena has a direction towards an object, creates the most difficult problem for the philosophy of mind. It leads immediately to the following dilemma.

The mind is somehow related to what it perceives, desires, fears, imagines, or it is not.

If the mind is not related to what it perceives, desires etc then one must give a non-relational account of intentionality. But there is at present no plausible non-relational account. (except in Buddhism where there is a distinction made between mind and contents of mind)

If the mind is related to what it perceives – what happens when the mind perceives something that does not exist ... for instance as in the mind desires something what shall never come to pass, or

asserts what is not the case such as a round square. If there is an intentional relation between the mind and what it perceives, then an intentional relation must hold between a mind that exists and something that does not exist. Is there a relation, totally different from 'ordinary' ones, which connects with what does not exist. Or does the round square after all exist. We are thus forced to accept either a 'weird' relation or forced to accept the existence of the non-existent object such as the round square or a golden mountain.. Materialistic treatments of philosophical problems are popular these days because they escape these dilemmas. If there are no minds (mental acts), intentionality disappears. (1995.412 Honderich) Behaviour is understood expansively as the 'observable' activities of an organism, including 'private events' like thinking, feeling. For instance in his Radical Behaviourism argues that thinking, choosing and deciding can be analysed as private behaviours with characteristic causal relations to overt behaviour and subject to conditioning. (1995.82 Honderich)

[9] Authentic : genuine as in an authentic signature or accurate, as in providing an accurate representation of the facts.

It comes from the Greek *authentēs*, one who acts independently from *Auto* + *hentes* a doer.

[10] For Kant a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. (2000,108.H.J.Patton) Kant argues that free will and natural causality are compatible, provided that human freedom – the capacity to act autonomously – is not taken to be an aspect of the natural world. Causality and freedom apply in separate domains; knowledge is restricted to the natural world and morality applies to the domain of freedom. Kant's resolution of the problem of freedom and determinism is the most controversial and fundamental feature of his moral philosophy. Kant identifies the fundamental principle of action to be outside the realm of preferences or commonly shared beliefs. He asks one rather minimal question: what maxims or fundamental principles could be adopted by a plurality of agents without assuming anything specific about the agents' desires or their social relations? The thought is that nothing could be a moral principle, which cannot be a principle for all. Kant's moral law is formulated as a demand. 'Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law', meaning that one can only choose actions that can be willed as a universal principle. Kant speaks of those who hold morally worthy principles as acting 'out of duty'. (1991,176. P.Singer)

[11] Freud's point is that the formations of the unconscious are determined i.e. that it is impossible to intentionally or arbitrarily make up a piece of nonsense. (2001:242.S.Freud Standard edition vol.6)